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UNAM, Mexico 
"h7,en asked to dine with caviar and wine, the Lady of Kent knew well 
what it meant, yet she went". 
INTRODUCTION 
Anonymous. 
The international environment s i n c e  the 1970s has been one of 
scccessive shocks. These have come forth while the '~urodollar market .  
corsclidated as a system uncontrolled by the* forces of the l enders  of 
last resort in the different countries. The international monetsry 
authorities delinked from gold and accepted the floating of currency 
e x c h a s e  rates, and inflation and interest rates were allowed to vary 
widely end attain the highe~t~levels in two decades. Confronted with 
such shocks, and facing the international conditions just outlined, 
the L s t i n  'Americans decided not to slow the wheels of industry by con- 
su-.ing less oil, but rather to increase their rates of growth. 
4 
S i n c e  the late forties the world has experienced an era of tre- 
rner.50~~ econonic expansion. The Latin American countries, as part of 
t h e  developing world, have been growing at rates seldom paralleled in 
history. Since 1950 the rates of economic growth of the developing 
cou~tries have been averaging 5.5% a year, in real terms, w i t h  Latin 
America being slightly above the average. The ratios of investment 
.* . .LL 
snd saving to total expenditure have increased substantially. In 
Latin kmerica,gross domestic investment in the 1970s was close to 
2 5 %  of gross domestic product. Of course, there was still 
a savings gap, and the usual nedd for capital inflows from those 
Thus, batin America adjusted to the shocks, capital-rich countries. 
. given the environment, by applyang thee same strategy t h a t  had worked 
bcfo re ;  growing out of its problems. 
But in addition, the Latin American countries begac to abanson 
their older beliefs in the benefits of import substituting industrial- 
I 
i z a t i o r a s  part of t h e i r  adjustihents to the momentous changes of the 
They opened their eaonomies significantly. Export sur- 
pluses in trade balances have not been infrequent in Latin America 
Curing the seventies and early eighties. They are now only willing 
to p r o m t e  import su~stituting industry to the e x t e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  
j u s t i f i a b l e  by dynamic comparative advantage within the various Latin 
knerican integration areas. They are not so prone either to under- 
take white-elephant type of inv+stments or to grant types of pro- 
t e c t i o z  that will create diffichlties downstream for their export in- 
dustries,and even their primary product lines. 
However, as a result of this combination of environment and pol- 
icy, the Latin American total f~reign debt has reached $350 billion. 
This debt is concentrated in the largest economies, and for those 
.C 
countries the interest payments on the debt now represent close 
to 50% of their ex~ort earnings~ For 1982 and 1983, per capita income 
has 6eclined in these countries as they adjust their econonies to heavy 
debt  repayment. 
In the sections that follow an-attempt is made to consider the 
. . 
r e c e n t  changes in the environment of interrlation' a 1  trade dnd finance, 
pzrtlcul~rly as they concern the Latin American nations. These are 
c c z ~ l r r r e ~ t e d  by an exanination of development strategies in present 
These pieces are followed by an analysis of possible so lut ions  
to short run di l e ,m~as  through international public lending, particu- 
l e r l y  exszining the role of the InterAmerican Development Bank. .In 
closing some conclusions are derived for economic stabilization policy 
ir. Latin America, and for international agreement on private debt 
r e p z y z e n t  schemes. 
RECENT CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 
The apparent cornucopia brought about by an expanding world trade 
h a s  never been a totally unmixed blessing. For one thing, like all 
cumulative growth mechanisms, it partakes of the "riding on a tiger" 
logic .  Once the race starts ,  it cannot stop. At increasingly higher 
. . *b 
levels of activity the delicate mechanism of world trade can easily 
~ e t  derailed by a host of difficulties, ranging from the misalicnmeat 
of e x c h a ~ g e  rates to deflationpry domestic policies, not to exclude 
the occurrence of purely stochastic events. Once one or a few countries 
begin to react defensively to adverse happenings, the stage is set for 
successive rounds of mutually damaging beggar-thy-neighbor type of 
R e c e n t  evenzs in the intetnational system of trade end finance 
~ r o ~ i C e  s good illustration. The system was thrown out of kilter by 
the oil shock of 1974-1975, the oil shock of 1979-1980, and the 
s n b s e q u e n t  financial shock of 1980-1982. Heightened interdependence 
h+d sccentuated the role imports played in determining domestic macro- 
econorr-ic equilibrium, particularly after the liberalization of trade 
I 
the: f c l l owed  the ltecnedy and kokyo Rounds. However, the resulting 
w o r l e  of the eerly eighties led to a rising tide of protectionism. 
T L.. t- ti1 19% i n t e r r z t i o n a l  trade had first stagnated and then declined. 
After ar. average annual &owth rate of eight percent in merchandise 
tra6e =on? industrial countries for the period 1950-1975, the r e a l  
vo1u.e of world cormerce increased by 1.5 percent in 1980, was flat 
in 1981, and actually declined in 1982 and 1983. 3 
In order to exemplify the nature of the highly sensitive inter- 
dependence between world econo~ic activityo and trade, Bergsten and 
Cline have recently postulated. the following Eelationship: "When 
economic a c t i v i t y  in t h e  OECD countries is growing at a rate above 
1.5 percent per year in real terms, their non-oil imports tend to grow 
. . 
about three times as fast; yet, when the growth of product and incorne 
is below 1.5 percent, their imports flatten out or decline". 
current bright note is that economic expansion has been vigorous in the 
Y .  S. during the first, second, and third quarters.  of 1984 (at an annual 
rate of growth of G;NoP.. of over 6 percent), following the strong re- 
covery of the economy in 1983. Likewise, Western European econocies 
aF?ear tc be showing an average growth rate of G.1; P. above two per-' 
cezt fcr the first three quarters of '1984. These encouraging develop- 
aents m y  help to bring about an amelioration of the protectionist 
syclrs7.e. In addition to the recent stagnation in international tra6e. 
z m o s t  uzfavorable occurrence which also significantly worsened the 
la ti^ L-~ierican economies, was also the drastic contraction in the 
f l s v  cf capital to less developed countries since 1982. To   at in 
&'~.ericz this had amounted to $38 billion in 1981, declining to half 
4 
t h z t  figure in 1982, and to less than $4.5 billion in 1983. As a 
r e s ~ l t ,  there were larger flows of capital from Latin America to the 
r e s t  the world approximately billion and billion 
ir? 1963. The decrease in capital imports predictably led to a rapid 
slow-down in the rate of growth of the external debt. 5 
According to the ECLA estimates,-a successful rescheduling of the 
external debt which would be compatible with the' maintenance of social 
and political stability in the area, by holding the line on per capita 
lncose at the 19S2 level, would require an annual flow of capitel i c t o  
Latin A~erica of about $35 billion, which would roughly cover upconing 
debt obligations for the next two to three years. Ai notee by the 
I 
author in a recent publication: "If the flow - .  af resources or its 
ecco-panylng conditions are s ~ c h  as to curtail or hinder the nornal 
I 
ser*iicir.g ~f the debt and the developmental process itself, this vi 11 / 
te- t  to b r i n ~  about the very nesults which are often feared by the 
r .2s t  pessinistic observers. In that case, 'their inclination w i l l  be I 
to attribate the +i.:perienced ceality to the operation of some inevitable 
forcss thst preseternined the outcome itself rather thar? to the very 
stye policies which are adopted in order to forestall its occurrence." 
1 
I 
I 
PRESE?JT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES, IN LATIN AMERICA 
X t e r  the practical experiences of the post-war decades and the 
tbecretical advances in the f i e l d  of development strategy, largely 
base2 on accumulated empirical evidence, a sensible and eclectic 
position widely shared by many academians and policy makers seems to 
be emer~ing. Extreme autarchic views and dependentist positions are ' 
rapidly receding as viable solutions to the complex problems of world 
I 
development and trade. ~ l t h o j g h  it is apparent that institutional 
and organizational changes and adjustinents in the economic relations I 
.* . 
. cC 
between developed and less de$eloped countries, .leading to a more I 
balance6 relationship among them, is clearly looming in the horizon 
I 
and graeaally asserting itself as the wave *of the future, it is equally 
evident that increasing interdependence and not dewlinking is the only 
acswer to the needs an8 aspirations of the people of the world. 
- 
Obv~ously, each country and regional grouphg will have t o  find 
its o w 2  position. which in turn will probably have to change over t i m e .  
Konetheless, progress has been made insofar as the range of admissible 
d e s i s t i o n  from t h e  i n t e r v a l  of e f f i c i e n t  solutions has been narrowed. 
. 
ir t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  i t  is  interesting t o  refer in p a s s i n g  to the r e c e n t  
w,-rl: of econo~ists l i k e  Bela Balassa and Hollis Chenery  as an example 
In Esszy 1 of h i s  recently published book, The Newly Industrisl- 
i t i r : c  Courtries in t h e  World Economy, Balassa 
p~iots c s t  thet: "The experience of developing countries in the p o s t -  
d 
w z r  pe r i cd  leads to certain policy prescriptions. F i r s t ,  while infant 
i - d a s t r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  c a l l  for the preferential treatment of manu- 
facturins a c t i v i t i e s ,  this should be done on a moderate scale, both 
t o  a v o i d  t h e  establishment and the maintenance of inefficient indus- 
tries and t o  e n s u r e  the continued expansion of primary production for 
domestic and for f o r e i g n  m a r k e t s .  Second, one should provide equal 
t r e a t m e n t  to exports and to import substitution in the manufacturing 
sector, in order to e n s u r e  allocation according t o  comparative a d v a n t a g e  
and the exploitation of economies of scale." He goes on to indicate 
I I 
that, "Ar. outward-oriented devblopment strategy should not be interpret- 
i . . 
ed to mean favoring exports ovkr import substitution. Rather, it is 
c h a r a c t e r j z e d  by providing sirnklar incentives to product ion for domes- 
tic an5 for export markets." 
J. very illuminating i l l u s  ration of Balassa's views is their ap- t I 
plicztion to theexperience of Latin American countries within the I 
frcnework of first-stage and siecond-stage import substitution in the 
I . 
post-war period. His discussi)on of the experiences of Argentina, Brazil, 
Color.5iaf and Mexico, withAnijtially heavily inward oriented strategies, 
follotied by moderation of sam$ after the beginning of the second stage, 
would seen to accord well with t h e  actual performance of the couritries 
ix question. I I 
I 
Along t h e  same lines, thq most recent work of Hollis Chenery 
I 
and the actual economic perfokmance of the countries involved on the 
1 
Balassa s findings and his poiicy implications and prescriptions. After 
.- . 
other, Chcnery indicates the dvantages ,  shortcomings and limitations 
1 
Structural C h m c e  and Developvent Policy, 
which recapitulates an$ supplements his earlier investigatio~s 
I I 
with Watanabe and Syrquin,  fubdamentally confirms the basic outline of 
discussing various patterns ob development based on empirical e v i -  , 
I 
dence regarding the strategieb and policies adopted on the one hand 
of these f u n d a e n t a l  ~atterns: (a) primary oriented, (b) balanced and 
I 
I I I 
I 
I 
(c) industry oriented. One overall conclusion of direct r e l e v a m e  
to our concerns is that excessive protection, or its slanted appli- 
catios for the purpose of pursuing a strongly oriented import-sub- 
stitution strategy, always proves very costly in the end in terms 
af a reduced rate of growth of the economy.. . .  - 
Lstir: American leaders and policy makers are very much aware 
of these realities. In this context, there are three other related 
considerations regarding the nature ,of the development process about 
which there is very little dispute nowadays and which serve to further 
narrow the area of divergence over the choice of strategy. 
The first, directly tied to the notion of dynamic comparative 
a e v z n t a g e ,  reinforces a coordinated drive to bring about import sub- 
stitution, along with the enlargement of the domestic market f-or the 
sake cf exploiting econom_les of scale, and a simultaneous promotior. 
of nanufactured exports, without detriment to the cost structure of 
traditional exports. 
The second point has to do with schemes of economic integration 
and regional trade. It is obvious that a sound and minimally balanced 
development process has to make use of the great internal possibilities 
of larger integration areas for real external economies of many differ- 
.- 
, ..& 
ent kinds. Not only would regional integration .and cooperation serve 
t o  g r e e t l y  r a t i o n a l i z e  resourcie allocation patterns, b u t  would also . ,  
help to decrease the risks attlendant on s t r i c t l y  subscr ib ing t o  t h e .  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  division of labqr model. Latin America i s  large and 
I  I 
diverse enough to fruitfully take advantage  in peeking optimal p a t t e r n s  
of r e s ione l  and sub-regional qpecialization. 8 '  ' 
T h e  t h ~ r d  i s s u e  deals with  the need to maintain socio-political I ' 
s t a k i l i t y .  I t  i s  i n  this convection, t h a t p i t  must be insisted that 
azy successful development sttategy in Latin America 'must not lose 
s i g k t  of the necessity to pay heed to the basic needs approach. In 
the effort t o  ~ e e t  short-run difficulties, one - .st not be oblivious 
tc t h c  fur?darner,tal requirements for stabil;+-T and continuity, an9 of ' 
I 
the true long tern interests of t h e  area. 
I 
I 
L s t i n  -W.erica does n o t  need any radical revision of its develop- 
.a 
r e r . t a l  s t r a t e g y .  kt this point, there are no longer any great t he00  ( 
r e t i t z l  debates on this topic. What is required is  the necessary 
u c l e r s t a n d i n g  and support to 6uccess fv l ly  negotiate short-term ob- I 
s t a c l e s ,  imbalances  and maladoustments which will inevitably take 
place both i n  t h e  world and regional economy in the normal course 
of e v e n t s .  
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL FINANCINq 
One of the major strands of the scenario that  dawned upon t h e  
. .> ~ - -7 
, . --. 'a: ' A. : . . . .  
-11- 
uarld ecoroay in the 1970s was the decline in the participatioc of 
o f f ~ c ; a l  sources ic supplying the financial needs of the developing 
world. The effcrts devoted to aid and concessional lending by the 
a2var.ccZ catio~s, as part of thei r  C . N . P . ,  began to drop noticeably 
t c~z ;Cs  the end cf the development decade of -the 1960s. The .decaEe 
zf t h e  E e w  international economic order that followed was one of 
:zcreesiKS confrontations at the North/South dialogues an6 t-he UKCTAD 
r .  The s t a g e  was set for a substantial vacuum to develop re- 
g:rCiag the f i n a ~ c i a l  needs of the developing world. 
i z t i n  A z e r i c ~ ,  elready ascribed as the middle class of the world, 
As the scffere2 r ;ore from the ebbing of development lending and aid. 
i E s 3 L e  of g r a z u a t i o n  emerged in'the mid 1970s, to complement the in- 
creasirg cozcentration of development funding on low income countries, 
* t P . e  pDor segxents of the population, and'the basic needs approach, the 
c x k t r i e s  of Latin k ~ e r i f a  were forced to search for new sources of 
The first oil shock added a new dimension to international lend- 
i n s .  Recycling provided new sources of funds,  but a new borrowing 
need arose for the developing world over and above the long-standing 
capital formation requirements. O i l  being perhaps thespmduct of 'intemdiate 
and finel demand par excellence, it was esseqtial to ensure a certain 
level of oil imports to keep the wheels turning, transportation running 
2 - 5  hsusiq supplied with ppder for cooking and lighting. Agair. sf- 
* I 
iectee the nost were the L a t i r i  American nations, which had greater 1 
1r.terr;e2late an5 fins1 c o n s ~ p t i o n  uses for what has been adroitly 
t e rned  "black gold". 
Khcn international private banking began to increasingly utilize 
t h e  liqcldity avsilable in $he world money centers  to recycle t h e  
. - EE .Jk -  
I 
..ce cf trade surpluses c$f the oil exporters, developing nations, 
-c- 
=.., es;e;ially the Latin Amqrican countries, welcomed the move. 
-. - -.c 
-;.,. c ~ s r 5  loan volcnes by the money-center banks in - the C' . S ., Europe 
Sharply 
- - 
- c  I 
 -..- ;q:r. . savz k i s e  to an uqparalleled decade of international pri- 
?.lthouah the aew l end ing  was a t  higher rates of inter- 
ezt t h s z  the concessional filnancing previously available, all things 
c~xsiCered, the cost differehces were not that great, because of the 
'flcxiSllity, lac!; of conditibnality and untied nature of t h e  p r i v a t e  
I 
-& different world would be upon us nowadays if official assis- 
tance'and l ending  had complied with the  responsibilities that lay 
aheed in the decade of the\i70s,  rather than shrink away from the 
financial needs of the less $eveloped nations. 9 It is true that t i e  
I 
word of t h e  day put f o r t h  by the advanced countries was that trade, 
not ai8, would cure the illsi of the developfng world. Y e t ,  the 
apparent dilemma between traoe and a i d  was clearly a moot point. 
Kith the mezn relative levels of hiving of the.developing countries 
b e i r . ~  ;bout one tenth of those of the developed world, clearly both 
sozrces of g r w t h  had to conplement each other for some time yet. 
. . 
. . 
. . 
!.;?re thtn a o'ecade later the world has come full c i r c l e ,  and 
ncv is l i g h t  years away fron t h e  f a i l u r e  of t h e  Oil Facility st the 
1;:: after t k e  f i r s t  o i l  shock. The IMF, together with the WorlS 
- - 
~s:.:; ~ ~ - 5  t h e  cad rz  of regional banks and special lending agencies, 
. 
z r e  viczrously expanding their iaternational lending and asserting 
- Li.xr l ~ a 5 c r s h i ' ~  in the f i e l d .  They are filling the vacuum thzt 
J- 'i- --. 
,,,:, k? 5  or..^ c o r i t r l  t-luted to creste. With international private 
. . l e ~ : ~ i 1 1 ;  tc Lztir. A-ycrica being mostly of an involuntary nature, 
+ -  , r ~ s  is a welcxie c1:cnge. 
'ne ~ 0 ~ 1 5  eCai:cz;r is a non-zero sum game in which the stronger 
1 
cox-? t r ies  probably have the most to gain. It is clear that the 
r.c.riber one priority at t h z  mament is to ensure the renewed growth 
of w o r l d  trade and finance. To attain these objectives, the best 
prcspects lie in the expansion of the activities of the international 
p ~ b l i c  lending agencies and official donors. The stability and 
growth t h e  world economy and the f i n a n c i a l  
developing world have become common cause. 
requirements t h e  
W i t h  respect to Latin America however, t h e r e  is an especially 
treacherous road to traverse. The higher levels of income in the 
uestern Henisphere will make the international l ending  agencies 
hesitant tc provide much increased resource flows to this part of 
the Ceveloping world over the longer future. It is here that the 
role of regional financial odganizations, lik; the InterAmericar, 
DelTe1o2sent B m k ,  cen become of utmost importance. This i n s t i t u -  
t i c .  xzs designed for aiding in the developing process of L a t i n  
; -.. - C- X c a ,  '- ? zr,5 will not shy away from such responsibility despite 
press-res from the  issue o f  gsaduati'on. Yet it must attract in- 
crezsing sources of finance so as to funnel the capital available 
ir t h e  w c r l d  mar-ket s  and the ~dvanced countries towards the niadle- 
c l e s s  r,ations of Latin America. To better ponder t h e  performance 
that car: be expecte6 from the InterAmerican Development Bank in 
ttr futcre, the recent trajec org of its financial operatio~s 
shcz ld  LC reviewee. t .  
RECENT FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERAMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK - 
- 9  
In 1983, the InterAmerican Development Bank increased  its l end -  
I 
i c g  to L a t i n  America to a total of $3.05 b i l l i o n  dollars a year. al- 
though this was the authorized volume, loan disbursements were much 
I 
less ,  amounting to $1.73 billion. This represented a A 4 %  increase 
over the 1982 disbursements. .b 
Cosnizant of the predicament described above, the Bank has j u s t  
finishe3 a replenishment operation that would boost its capital 
subscription to $30.81 billion in total resources at the e n d  of 
1983. At the same time, the Bank has increased its borrowings in 
the world's capital markets, having borrowed $1.41 billion in 1963, 
and has  been p l a c i n g  s e v e r a l  issues, amounting to $1.70 billion dol-. 
. . 
l z r s ,  i~ 1984. 
S i n c e  most of the subscriptions constitute callable capital, 
uses the paid s u b s c r i p t i o n s ,  the borrowings, its level 
. 
reserves (which stood at $ 2 . 2 3  billion dollars a t  the end of 1983) 
However, the nex a c e  lsa: repayztnts to c o n d u c t  ordinary business. 
s u k s c r i ~ t i o ~ s  c~zstitute an impressive.backing for the operations cf 
t 3 c  i C 9 ,  and represent a very solid leveraging of all the l oans  
c'2tF.::1ze2 by tke Bank. 
C c r x e n t r e t i n g  on the replenishment agreed upon in 1983,  it will 
4 
c x s t ~ t u t e  ac irxrease of $15.70 billion dollars i n  the Bank's re- 
socrcea during the 1983-85 period, or an almost 50:iincrease by 1986. 
:.lthouch operations will not expand that quickly as long as the paid- 
in portion of the cepital expansion remains small, the 1984 contribu- 
t i o c s  ($1.275 billion) represent important additions to the paid-in 
capital of the BanLwhich at the end of 1983 amounted to $2.10 billion 
dollars. 
The Bank adopted in 1983 a special program of interest rate de- 
ductiocs, financed from i t s  capital resources. This would mean tha t  
c e r t z l z  hnrd-presses countries! were charged below normal rates of . 
~ n t e r e s t  f o r  sone loafis. A t  the sane time, i t  began undertaking a . 
I 
. . q c a  := t z t i v c  prograz to provide special lending to countries experi- 
ezcfc; Sravr balance-of-paymenit problems and debt repayment strin- 
I 
I 
- 7 .  I t  s h z u l S  be n o t e e  tlhat t h e  IDB has. been entrusted w i t h  
I . . 
I 
- .  
- : -  at the i n t e r n ~ t f i o n e l  level, the public and private 
I 
;:SF.: s t  r z c c  t ;! C e r t r a l  ~ e r i c a ,  which is carrying an unusua.1 bureer. 
r. t c r z . 3  of its p d i t i c a l  c r i s i s , o v e r  and above the afflictiocs 
m - w  -.--9 - 
~ C . - Z _  L - ~ . : *  cf fectir.(j the rest qf ~ a t h  America. 
- ?  -nP. 
.:. aLbc-?lish~ext of the Bank in 1983 was the creat ion of the 
r -.: v:--.-T: I.. -. . . - ;e- l c ~ n  I n 0 z e s t r ; . ~ n t  Corpqrstion, which will a c t  like the ti'orld 
C .  
: i r , t e r r . ~ t i o r . e l  Financecorporat ion (IFC). It  will operate 
\,,-: -i- ., e?uity c~pital seared t o h e l p  small and medium-sized enterprises 
. _ .$.;t!-, _ _  c a p i t a l  i n f u s 1 o r . s  that -w@uld help promote private i n v e s t ~ e n t  in 
This iritiative will complement the co-financing ' that t h e  IDB 
bas Seer. c o n d u c t i n g  f o r  some ears without much success. Such comple-. + 
c.er.tary f i n a n c i n g  only raised's30 mill ion in the world 's  private 
c a p i t a l  markets during 1983. In contrast with the usual IDB terms, 
I 
c o - f i a a n c i n g  loans charge the) prevailing' rates in the credit markets, 
generzlly a fixed spread over LIBOR or the prime rate.. This is in 
.* - .a 
c o n t r a s t  wi th  " l d a n s  extended/  directly by the Bank.. . .which may vary 
I 
 fro^ 1% to 4% an concessionarb resources to the 11% rate in effect 
will have to provide for Latin America nations a respite of severel 
yeer s  in making mortization and interest payments on their foreign 
debts. 
If expor t  earnings continue to revive, and if voluntary private 
l e r 5 x ~  rcsVc..es, the greatly expanded contribution that international 
~:L-l:c 1er .Er . r~  and rich country donors will have to provide (as br id se  
I G L - S ,  erergsncy short-term l e n d i n g ,  larger quotas in internatiocel 
i - c +  t i . ,  increased aid flows, etc. )  in these l o n g - r a n g e  re- 
.= .ny,em > ?  
- -  L l i n g s  ney substantially diminish. Nonetheless, the healthy 
rc-xcry ~ c d  continued expansion i n  t h e  world's economy over t h e  
. C h r  
L X J S  acd 1990s. reqcire a c??ar  leadership role on the part of the 
i n n ? ?  ;..Lstrial nations, which must be accompanied by the acceptance of  
'their responsibility in groviding ample development financing for 
their less fortunate partners in the international economic network. 
CONCLUSION 
The trade surpluses that have been c r e a t e d  in the short-ruc, and 
which have resulted in the servicing and repayment of over 30 b i l l i o n  
I i- L ~ t i r .  $-~~ncricer. debt  in 1983, have been sthe result of sharply tig?,t-. 
.:IS a result, pro?uctio~ began disintegrating in Latin kmeric 
~ i t h  sczrc i t i es  of basic ioputs providing the spark. Clearly t h e  
*- .-. ,:
. _ - c t i v a t i o r r  of the Latin Lxerican economies has to go hand in hand 
:..-;r?. t ? . ~  exp2nsi:n 05 their export earnings. Actually the volu~e of 
e::;crtc of L z t i r .  kzerica ha5 increased significantly over the past 
ty::l or t hsee  geers ,  b u t  their value has n o t .  In terns of t o t a l  
I 
a c t i l T i t y .  the per cspita g ~ c s s  national product  of these c o u n t r i e s  
I 
s~ffereZ a steep decline slince 1981. 
- 
To allow this positiye-sum-game solution to take ho ld  in the 
Latin P n e r i c a n  economies, i t  is essential that rescheduling of their 
I 
external debts be following a long-run general plan of 
8 
action, agree6 upon betwegn private and public lenders, an5 the borro~ 
ing nations. Such overall solution would be a p p l i e d  to each individ-' 
ual country in accordance with the casuistic demand made by the  par- 
ticular circumstances characterizing t h e m , , I t  is obvious such a schex 
cr. l i s t n r s e x e n t s  made OR new conventional loans in 1983." 10 
F x a l l y ,  a new prosram that should also be hi~hlighted is the 
spccial lenZing provided for exports and industrial teactivatio~. 
Z : l s  p r o g r z z ,  iritiate2 in 15.82, is p r e d i ~ a t ~ d  upon the nee:! of the 
L z t i r .  . ~ . E T ~ c ~ T .  co?ir.tries to increase exports, so as to generate the 
t r i . 5 ~  surpluses required to service their external debt. Such ef- 
f c r t s  caccot  Lc expected to succeed unless their interne1 e c 0 n o r . i ~  
ertivity rebounds fro3 the cyclical troughs experienced in 1963. In- 
~::.tr:;l 1aar.s h a w  beer. earmarked for countries where capsc i ty  util- 
- e -  
.-,-L:- h i s  bee:. qnite low, mainly as a result of scarcities of ic- 
terz.=.E; ~ t e  ir.pq2ts i n c r t e d  fror. abroad. 
P n r i  the above it 1 s  clear that the IDB, even with the recent 
*rcpler.isbL?er.t, cannot be expected to soon attract the resources re- 
qtire-5 to cone close t c  serving the annual loan requirements of 
L L e i c a .  In the next f e w  years, the Bank will at best be 
d~sbursicq strear.s of funds that may approach the $3 billion a 
y e a r  ~ s r k .  However, if the rich donor countries and internationel 
lending institutions would expand their activities at rates of growth 
sinilar to those of the InterAmerican Development Bank (about 15% a 
year) an important dent will be made in t h e  overall problems of fi- 
nancing investment and economic development Latin' America. 
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